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FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
N a time of rapid economic and social change the historical sepa-
ration of powers tends to become blurred and indistinct. Not-
withstanding the socil necessity for breaking down this incident
of the natural law of the eighteenth century, it has survived in the
United States to an extent unknown in other countries, possibly in
part because of the indigenous nature of one of its sustaining causes,
namely, the unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to
exercise jurisdiction in any but the.most pressing of cases, with the
consequent undue limitation of the concept "judicial."' But the
facts of life defy dogmatic verbal classification. With the growth
of the industrial era, with the necessity for expert regulation which
a Congress or Parliament is unable to supply, and with the necessity
for governmental control and supervision of much private enter-
prise, there has come into being a sphere of governmental activity
known as administration, which embraces all three of the tradi-
tional aspects of governmental powers. Two of its significant
characteristics are its extraordinary growth and the concomitant
necessity of the individual for protection against it. That protec-
tion in the United States is found mainly in a wr'tten Constitution
as interpreted by the courts, a protection which is the greater
because of its very flexibility, for "due process of law" like "natural
justice" supplies afornula in which to clothe the judicial view
of what is fair and just in the light of the time and circumstance.
But in turn, the attempt to reconcile this necessity for delegating
governmental power to officers and administrative bodies who enter
intimately into the daily life of the individual, with the traditional
ICJ. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 288 U. S. 461 (1932). If the state r-
gards the function as judicial, the Supreme Court should not undertake to call
it administrative, though practically the result of the decision in the Porter
Case, requiring the complainant to exhaust his state remedies before invok-
ing federal relief, may be approved. On rehearing, 287 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct.
132 (1932), the Court seems to conclude that the grant to a state court of the
power to review the decision of an Investment Commissioner under the "Blue
Sky" law, revoking a permit, with power to set it aside, modify or conirm It
"'as the evidence and the rules of equity may require," may yet be sum lntly
judicial not to infringe the separation of powers provision of the state consti-
tution. When it is administrative for one purpose and judicial for another,
the distinction becomes rather unconvincing.
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views concerning the separation of 'powers, has placed a severe
strain on the intellect in following the purported distinctions of
the courts between functions "judicial," "quasi-judicial," "execu-
tive," "legislative," "quasi-legislative," and now "administra-
tive," a term which is finally winning a place. The very term
"administrative law" was but a generation ago deemed exotic,
although the necessity for subjecting to control the arbitrary use
of discretion by administrative authorities as a protection to the
individual against corrupt and misguided administrative action
had with growing frequency been reflected in judicial decisions.
The reluctance to admit any special rules of law for the control of
the official organization and of its relations with the citizen led
Dicey to inveigh against the "droit administratif" of the French
law.2 He might as well have protested against maritime law, con-
stitutional law, ecclesiastical law; and his assumption that English
law in its judicial protection of the subject was superior to the
French law could hardly have been founded on any clear appre-
ciation of what the French law actually accomplished. Perhaps
he permitted alien method to conceal substance. Prejudices when
ostensibly sustained by formulae are hard to overcome.
Whether the individual is effectively protected against the ad-
ministration, whether the individual has adequate safeguards for
his freedom against the group, depends not on the name of an
institution or a tribunal, but on the mores of a particular com-
munity as reflected in the political instruments it creates. Starting
from varying historical foundations and premises, the German,
French, English, and American systems developed in the beginning
of the nineteenth century different forms of control over those who
wielded governmental powers. Encroachments upon individual
liberty were in all these systems designed to be kept, in principle,
within the limits of social necessity. Yet, who was to draw the
line? Who was to be the judge whether the line had been appro-
priately drawn ? Here indigenous history and tradition determined
the answer. In one country the suspicion of the Executive, in others
suspicion of the legislature, and in one, France, suspicion of the
.courts produced varying institutions for achieving control over the
governmental machine. Even with but a limited parliamentary
control, as in the case of Prussia, the mores of an uncorruptible
administration implanted by Frederick the Great, combined with
the development of the theory of the Rechtsstaat, the state under
2
"Droit amhinitratif in Modern Freneh Law," 17 L. Q. Rev. 302 (1901).
134 I
vie s concerning t e s r ti f ' r , l s
strai t i t ll t i f ll i t t i
the c rts et ee f ti s j icial," quasi-judicial," - ,
tive," "legislative," " asi-legislative," " i i tra-
tive, " a ter ic is fi ll i i l . t
"administrative law" was but a generation ago dee ed ti ,
although the necessity f r s j ti t tr l t it
f is r ti i i tr ti t
individual against corrupt a is i e i istr ti ti
had ith r i fre e c r fl t i j i i l .
he reluctance to a it s i l r l s f l f r .t t l
t ffi i l r i ti l
i t i i i t t it i i t tif
la .2 e i t as ell r t st i t iti ,
stit ti alla , l si sti l l ; i
la in its jucUcial r tecti f t s j t ri r t t
rench la c l r l f
ciation f at t r l t ll li .
he per itted alien ethod t c ceal s sta ce. r j i s
ostensibly s stai e f r l r r t .
et er t e i i i l i ff ti l t t
inistration, et er t i i i l t
his freedo a ai st t e r , t t
i stit ti r tri l, t t
unity as reflecte i t liti l i tr ts t .
fro ar i ist ri l f ti s i , ,
re c , lis , ri t l
f t e i etee t t r iff r t
i l r tal . ts i l
liberty ere i all t s s st s i t t, l ,
it i t li its f i l it . ,
li e f s t t j t r t
ri tely r Y i s iti i ed
t r. I tr t i i ,
i i t l i l t ,
. rts r ced r i i tit ti s i l r
r tal i . n it t t rlia entary
tr l, i t i , f ti le
a i istration i l ted r rick t t, i
the develop ent of the t e r f t e tsst t, t t t der
211Droit ailmini&trat£{ in Modem French Law," 17 L. Q. :Rev. 302 (1901).
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
law, had assured the German people an administrative system
designed to insure the public advantage while avoiding improper
encroachments on the freedom of the individual. It is even now,
I think, an open question whether this protection is better assured
in judicial courts, which alone control the administration in several
of the states of the Reich, or in the administrative courts, which
have been instituted in other states. Possibly the establishment of
a federal administrative court, now under consideration, may turn
the protective machinery into the administrative channel.
In France, prior to 1789, the parlements were courts of justice
as well as administrative bodies. The French citizen had learned to
distrust the parlements and the Royal "intendants," who acted as
judges in the provinces. This is given as one of the reasons why
the French have never been willing to allow their courts, even
after the constitution of 1790, to assume the power to declare
legislation unconstitutional. But while courts were separated from
the administration, the .administration was also largely removed
from any control by the courts. To allay the dissatisfaction result-
ing from the inability to challenge the validity of administrative
acts, Napoleon, about 1800, granted to citizens the right to complain
before the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), in its special commit-
tee known as the Comitg du Contentieux, who at first gave only ad-
vice to the government as to how to deal with the complaint. Gradu-
ally, however, the (omit6 du Contentieuz has evolved into a court
as judicial in its outlook as the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords or of the Privy Council, or the United States Court of Claims.
In 1831, after the second fall of the Bourbons, an oral hearing was
granted, and in 1849, with the fall of the monarchy, the Commission
du Contentieux, as it was then called, was permitted to give formal
judgments and not merely advice,. In 1872, the Tribunal of Con-
fficts, composed partly of administrative and partly of judicial
judges, was created to pass upon questions of conflicting claims to
jurisdiction by the administrative and judicial courts.
It seems strange, and is explainable only on historical grounds,
that when the injured individual sought protection against the ad-
ministration he had to turn to an administrative body, the Conseil
d'Etat, which was certainly closer to the administration than the
judicial courts. It was this fact which unfavorably impressed Dicey.
Yet the administrative courts have more than justified the faith
reposed in them. The event merely proves that form is not decisive
of substance, for the individual secured far greater protection from
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the administrative courts than he had ever obtained from the judi-
cial courts, which, within limits, were opened to him. The latter,
after 1832, acquired the power to declare administrative ordi-
nances, even certain presidential ordinances, "illegal," but only
after the individual had violated them and been prosecuted. Then
they could refuse to fine him. But to challenge the ordinance by
a declaratory judgment of illegality for ultra vires, without first
violating it, the individual had to resort to the administrative courts.
They were thus among the first tribunals to exemplify the value of
the declaratory judgment in challenging the validity of adminis-
trative acts, a system which, if generally adopted in the United
States as it has been in England, would simplify judicial relief
against administrative illegality and do away with many of the
barnacles which have encumbered the writs of certiorari, prohibi-
tion, and injunction, not to speak of the speed and inexpensiveness
of the new procedure.
Thus, a century ago, there began in France that march of ad-
ministrative adjudication which has won general encomiums from
those interested in the substance of legal control over the adminis-
tration. The recourse for excis de pouvoir (ultra vires) was ex-
tended from the acts of minor officials to the acts of the President
himself, and this notwithstanding the fact that many of his acts
had first to be approved by the full Conseil d'Etat. The judicial
branch of that body assumed the power to nullify them, first for
defects of form, then for ultra vires. By a statute of 1872 reorgan-
izing and enlarging the functions of the Conseil d'Etat, all but a
few administrative acts were brought under the control of the Con-
seil, which advanced from case to case in the most approved Anglo-
American fashion. And even though the letter of the law had been
observed, the tribunal undertook to examine the motives of the ad-
ministrative officer, thus limiting his discretion by the test of dg-
tournement de pouvoir (abuse of power). Moreover, the power to
review the delegation of legislative power to the President, which
first escaped judicial control, and in principle still does, has been
greatly extended. The old category of actes de gouvernement, which
escape review, has been so narrowed as to include only a limited
number of the highest state activities, relating mainly to war and
diplomacy, which only occasionally directly affect the individual.
The growth of the administrative protection has crowded out most
of the protection or necessity for protection afforded by the judi-
cial courts, which, in theory, still have a considerable jurisdiction.
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That form and substance are distinct is evidenced by the United
States Court of Claims, which, though administrative in character,
affords, within its limited jurisdiction, an effective relief and pro-
tection for the individual against the government.
It is interesting to observe that the recent English commission
which was called into existence as a result, on the one hand, of the
,challenge of the New Despotism (the administrative hierarchy) by
Lord Chief Justice Hewart, and, on the other hand, of the demand
of Professor Robson for the institution of administrative courts
as a cheaper and more expert method of control over the adminis-
tration at the behest of a complaining individual, has decided to
adhere to the conservative English view that the judicial courts
are the most reliable means of protecting the individual against the
administrative machine.3 They do suggest that legislative commit-
tees watch over the delegated legislative (ordinance) power and
help to draft it, and that the administrative determination be final
on the facts only, with the right of appeal on questions of law to
the judicial tribunals. They'place a high value on the control of
the administration, in its quasi-judicial functions, so largely a mat-
ter of policy, by Parliament and public opinion. The rapid growth
of the legislative (ordinance) power by reason of the very com-
plexity of our social organization has made it increasingly impor-
tant in the life of the individual, so that some centralized control
over its substance and form is essential. A somewhat similar con-
trol over administrative ordinances was recommended by the Com-
mittee of the Progressive Conference at Washington (1931), over
which Senator Cutting presided. Both England and the United
States 'have instituted many administrative commissions and tri-
bunals, some in the United States federal government having most
important judicial functions, such as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Federal Trade, Power, Radio, and Employees' Compen-
sation Commissions, and the Customs Court. But on the whole,
their jurisdictional limits are determined by the judicial courts,
whereas they are allowed ever greater leeway in the exercise of dis-
oretion. It is the slight control of discretion which exposes the
weakness of the position of the individual, and it was to remedy
this defect that appellate administrative tribunals, such as the Board
of Tax Appeals, have gradually been established. Whether this ad-
ministrative appeal is an adequate protection can only be deter-
3 Committee on Ministerial Powers, Report presented April, 1932, Cmd. 4060.
138 p.
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mined by time and experience. That it is likely to be more expert
than courts is very probable. Possibly the American system, will
profit most by permitting an administrative appeal on questions
of discretion and policy and a judicial review of jurisdictional and
strictly legal questions. Much could be learned from the decisions
of the French Council of State on exes de pouvoir and dgtourne-
ment de pouvoir.
An excellent article by Professor Garner' presents a general out-
line of French administrative law, an article which relies on the
latest French sources and which might have made unnecessary Di-
cey's criticism of the modern French law. A comparison of the
English and French. administrative systems by Professor H. Ber-
th~lemy was published in a recent Bulletin Mensuel of the SociWt6
de Legislation comparge.' It is a virtue of continental law in general
that the decisions of the courts are subject to regular criticism by
the most distinguished authorities. The value of the publications of
decisions by Sirey and Dalloz in the field of administrative law is
enhanced by the critical notes of Professor Hauriou, Berth6lemy,
JTze, Appleton, and others, who have aided the administrative
courts and the public in general by their informed comments. Pro-
fessor Hauriou's notes between 1892 and 1928 have been collected
in a work of three volumes.' The official decisions of the Council
of State have been regularly published since 1821 in the Recueil
des arr~ts du Conseil d'Etat, cited by the names of its erstwhile
editors, Panhard, but more generally Lebon. The treatises of Pro-
fessor Berth6lemy and Hauriou, which have gone through many
editions, describe fairly fully the administrative .organization and
its functions. The lower administrative courts (the Conseils de prg-
fecture) and the highest (the Conseil d'Etat), with the Tribunal des
Conflits, are the subject of Duguit's well-known article on French
administrative courts ;' and Professor Garner discuises them in his
article on "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative
Acts." '
Laferri~re, formerly Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat, has
done much to advance the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat by his
4French Administrative Law," 33 Yale L. J. 597 (1924).
5 Nos. 4-6 (April-June) 1931.
6 Sirey, 1929.
7 "The French administrative courts," 29 Pol. Sci. Q. 385 (1914).
8 9 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 637 (1915).
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classic Traitg de la juridiction administrative.9 For the modern
developments, it has been overtaken for practical purposes by Pro-
fessor Appleton's Traits... du contentieux administratif.0
State responsibility in tort. Possibly the most important of the
contributions of modern French law to the development of ad-
ministrative science is the steady growth in 'the practice of per-
mitting the state to be sued for injuries arising out of the torts
and misfeasance of its officers. This has been a gradual develop-
ment, and has probably been aided by the fact that it has been de-
tached from the rigid requirements of any code, thus enabling it
to expand in the light of social conceptions of the proper distri-
bution of the loss among the individual, the community, and the of-
ficer. When an officer, in the performance of his public duties, un-
warrantably and by intention or mistake injures a citizen, the ques-
tion arises as to who shall bear the loss. Anglo-American tribunals
in general have believed, with the historical maxims of kings who
"can do no wrong" ringing in their ears, that it should be the of-
ficer, and they did not trouble to find out whether this was either
practical, expedient, or just. And even where the state recognized
the injustice of any such purported distribution of the risk of error
or misfeasance and by legislation sought itself to assume the burden
and risk, the courts threw obstacles in the way. Very recently the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has unani-
mously held that a New York City municipal ordinance admitting
liability for the error or mischance of a policeman'who in pur-
suing criminals shoots instead an innocent bystander, assumes not
a moral or equitable obligation, but makes an unconstitutional gift
to a private person."
The flexibility of the French Conseil d'Etat has made it easy
to drop antiquated views of this kind and to expand the state's lia-
bility from tort to "fault of the service" and finally to cases where
no "fault," but sheer accident only, can be discerned, such as the
explosion of a munitions dump. This jurisprudence has awakened
admiration on the continent and has aided greatly the movement
both in England and the United States to admit by statute govern-




1 Evans v. Berry, 236 App. Div. 334, 258 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1932). Appeal
is now pending in the Court of Appeals, who, it may be hoped, will reverse.
IOWA LAW .BEVIEW
The development in France was slow and gradual, accomplished
almost entirely by case law. France also began with the conception
that the state was not liable for official torts, but only the officer,
who could be sued before the regular judicial courts. Even for that,
the consent of the Conseil d'Etat was necessary before 1870, because
of its possible interference with the administration, and the consent
was rarely given. But after the Tribunal of Conflicts had decided
in 1872 that a distinction must be made between "official" and
"'personal" faults, that for the former the state could be sued in
the Conseil d'Etat, whereas for the latter the officer alone was liable,
the progress of administrative public responsibility became rapid.
In 1908, all inferior administrative bodies were made liable for of-
ficial "fault of the service." Then the distinctions between "per-
sonal" and "official" torts and between governmental (d'autoritg)
and corporate (de gestion) acts began to break down, and state
liability was admitted, within narrow exception, for both. "Per-
sonal" torts for which the state was not liable, but the officer alone,
became limited to those having no relation to the public service-
a development which was aided by the earlier conclusion, that two
suits for personal yet "service" faults were possible, one against
the officer, the other against the state, with two judgments. Yet the
collectibility of both was awkward. Hence from a subsidiary lia-
bility of the state, after vain execution upon the officer, the state
assumed primary liability, a result which made suit against the of-
ficer less and less frequent. This has resulted in the disadvantage
that, by the new practice and by the limitations upon the category
of "personal" and "unofficial" acts, the officer is in many eases
relieved of liability to any one, a fact which weakens the public
service. The pending English Crown Proceedings bill (Cmd. 2842)
and the Federal Tort Claims bill-which once passed Congress,
only to be vetoed by President Coolidge for a technical reason,
and which is likely soon again to pass-have avoided this possibility
by giving the state the right of recourse against the officer for wil-
12The reason was that the Comptroller of the Treasury had been given Initial
authority to pass upon claims and then had reserved to himself the privilege
of defending his judgment as counsel for the government in the appeal to the
Court of Claims. This seemed to the Attorney General an encroachment upon
his prerogative of defending the United States and an improper confusion of
the functions of judge and advocate. This defect is cured in the pending
Howell bill, which terminates the Comptroller's authority with his decision on
the claim. There is some danger in permitting a fiscal officer to become a ju-
dicial officer, even in first instance only.
FBENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ful acts. But at least the citizen is protected by having a responsible
defendant. New York state has made considerable headway in as-
suming liability for the torts of its agents, but in most of the states
the development of the law is hampered by the ancient judicial
maxims that the state cannot be sued at all without its consent and,
in the matter of municipal responsibility, by the view that torts
in the performance of "governmental" functions escape judicial
control and liability. The intellectual and social protests against
these restrictions may in time persuade more legislatures to break
them down. In Prussia and Germany legislation in 1909 and 1910
gave the citizen an exceptionally wide privilege of suit in the judi-
cial courts for money damages against the state when injured by
act of an official, even in performing "governmental" functions;
for corporate functions, the state had long been held liable under
the private-law rules of the Civil Code.
Watson's book, The State as a Party Litigant,3 discusses briefly
the evolution of French law. The subject is so fascinating that it
has, necessarily, attracted the attention of many French and other
scholars, among whom are Duguit, J~ze, Appleton, Berth6lemy, and,
as authors of significant monographs, Teissier, Duez, Masteau, Tro-
tobas, Mareq, Bourquin, Wodon, Laski, and Bonnard. The detailed
references to this literature may be found in the Guide to the Law
and Legal Literature of France.4
The courts and jurists of continental Europe have. been dealing
with this question for a century and have undertaken to present a
variety of explanations sustaining the theory of community as-
sumption of liability for the torts or malfeasance of its officers. By
characterizing the officer as an agent and the state or government
or group as the principal-not unnatural view-rules of private
law readily supplied a theory of governmental responsibility for
wrongful acts of the officer--either an implied negligence in selec-
tion or supervision, or the principal's guaranty of the good conduct
of his agent, or the rule which imposes automatic vicarious respon-
sibility based on identification or representation. The theory of
agency underlies the proposed English and federal legislative re-
form, above mentioned.
The supposed inadequacy of the private law theories was sug-
gested by those courts and writers who had become impressed with
Is 1927, chapter 10.
14 Edited by Professor Stumberg of Texas, and published in 1931 by the
Library of Congress.
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the intrinsic validity of the classical distinction bet~een "cor-
porate" and "governmental" acts. While private law conceptions
were deemed sufficient for "corporate" acts, they were deemed
insufficient for "governmental" acts. Responsibility for the latter,
indeed, usually depended upon express legislation. These views,
based upon "public law" explanations, were strengthened by the
decision of the French court in the celebrated Blanco Case," hold-
ing that responsibility could not be based on any general rule, but
found its explanation in the equitable reconciliation of the interests
of the state and of the individual; and as the courts began to assess
damages upon the state for many injuries, such as stray shots by
policemen and explosfons of munitions, without proof that any
officer was at fault, many jurists became convinced that the in-
elastic conceptions of the private law could not fit the new juris-
prudence. Possibly they did the private law an injustice. At all
events, innumerable legal, political, and philosophical theories were
advanced from many quarters to explain or rationalize the new
developments. Thus, we were made acquainted with the theories of
social contract, social insurance, quasi-contract, which have been
either abandoned or else absorbed in the broader legal theories of
' 'administrative fault" or "fault of th6 service" and governmental
"assumption of risk," theories in which the individual officer's tort
became either tenuous or fictional or was frankly dispensed with in
the greater emphasis laid upon the operative fact of individual in-
jury inflicted by the governmental machine. This is illustrated by
the statutes in most of the countries of Europe providing for state
indemnity to those innocent persons who have been erroneously
convicted in the criminal courts. The cycle from eminent domain
had now been practically completed; and while the older tort theo-
ries still sustained most of the cases, the new developments con-
centrated attention upon the effort to find broader political and
philosophical foundations to sustain this modern legal structure.
So we find advanced the doctrines of "equality" or "equitable dis-
tribution of burdens" between the individual and the public, of
"vested rights, " of "equity" and of "special sacrifice" regardless
of tort-all of which are designed to demonstrate that special sac-
rifices imposed upon or borne by the individual in the pursuit of the
common aim, the administration of the public service, should be
spread over the community as a whole, instead of resting, as they
Is Conflits, Feb. 8, 1873, Dalloz Per. 1873, 3. 17.
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so often have in earlier Anglo-American practice, solely upon the
injured individual.
This brief sket!ch of the French system of administrative law will
indicate that the adjustment of the relations between the individual
and the group is recognized as one of the most important functions
of government, and that the method of protecting the individual
against the state, which will, necessarily, vary with time and lo-
cality, is less significant than the substance of protection. The ex-
tent of that protection in the western world, at least, is one of the
sources of public and private confidence in government. The French
system, developed through the progressive views of the members
of the administrative courts, has doubtless aided greatly in per-
petuating the Third Republic, for, with the popular control of legis-
lation through the Chamber of Deputies, it has proved the balance
wheel between the conflicting claims of the individual and the ad-
ministration. It has served its purpose more efficiently, it is be-
lieved, than have the administrative systems of most other countries.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
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